Color and Credit Race, Regulation, and the Quality of Financial Services

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Consumer protection is important and is a focus of regulators across many areas in the economy.

▶ e.g., FTC, FDA, DoJ.

Banking and financial services have drawn a great deal of attention.

- debates on the fiduciary rule for financial advisors.
- ▶ recent Wells Fargo scandal.

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Our setting: mortgage lending.

Benchmark case: a frictionless world (e.g., no market power, no info asymmetry, no regulatory distortions)

In a world with frictions, distortions will be present.

- products may have restricted quantities, higher prices.
- populations may receive differential treatment.

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Plan of attack

Examining mortgage quality dilution (complaints):

- 1. Data & Research Design
 - "protect consumers from unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices and take action against companies that break the law."
 - ► We study mortgage complaints from 2012-2016:
 - about 175k complaints
 - ▶ 16k zip codes (covers ~ 282m people as of 2010 census)
- 2. Income, Education, & Race
- 3. The Role of Regulation

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Mortgage; Conventional fixed mortgage

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Example Complaint Narrative

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Company State & Zip Response

$$InComplaints_i = \rho(IER_i) + \sum_{b=1}^{50} (Mort_{b,i} + Pop_{b,i}) + \zeta_{zip3} + \nu_i$$

$$lnComplaints_i = \rho(IER_i) + \sum_{b=1}^{50} (Mort_{b,i} + Pop_{b,i}) + \zeta_{zip3} + \nu_i$$

	(1)	(2)	(3)
lnAGI			-0.10***
CollEd			(<0.01)
NonWhite			
MortBucket50 FE	No	Yes	Yes
PopBucket50 FE	No	No	Yes
zip3 FE	Yes	Yes	Yes
Observations	16309	16309	16309
R^2	0.47	0.80	0.81

p-values in parentheses

* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01

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lnAGI			-0.10***	
CollEd			(<0.01)	-0.08^{***} (<0.01)
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			(<0.01)	0.17^{***} (<0.01)
No	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
No	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
$16309 \\ 0.47$	$16309 \\ 0.80$	$16309 \\ 0.81$	$16309 \\ 0.81$	$ \begin{array}{r} 16309 \\ 0.82 \end{array} $
	No No Yes	No Yes No No Yes Yes 16309 16309	-0.10*** (<0.01) No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 16309 16309 16309	$\begin{array}{c ccc} -0.10^{***} & & \\ (<0.01) & & \\ & & -0.08^{***} & \\ (<0.01) & & \\ No & Yes & Yes & \\ No & No & Yes & Yes & \\ Yes & Yes & Yes & Yes & \\ 16309 & 16309 & 16309 & 16309 & \\ \end{array}$

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
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
lnAGI			-0.10***			-0.02*
			(<0.01)			(0.10)
CollEd				-0.08***		-0.06***
				(<0.01)		(<0.01)
NonWhite					0.17^{***}	0.16^{***}
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
Race controlling for income and education

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Summary so far

Lower quality (i.e., more complaints) in areas with

- Iower income
- Iower education
- higher minority population

Challenges for interpreting these results:

- true quality is unobserved.
- consumer preferences are unobserved.
- Are minority areas simply "complainers," regardless of the quality provided to them?

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The results are not likely driven by

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What might be the underlying drivers? What can be done?

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- Goals include
 - "promote the availability of credit and other banking services in lowand moderate-income communities."
- ► Low-to-moderate-income (LMI) tract (CRA focus areas):
 - median family income (MFI) \leq 80% of MSA-level MFI.
- Observably *identical* areas, including on income, can have *different* regulation-induced pressures to lend.


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Dallas median income: $68,900 \rightarrow LMI$ for tracts below 55,120.




Color and Credit

Begley & Purnanandam (tbegley@wustl.edu)

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


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 \Rightarrow \$50,000 tract is LMI for Dallas, but not LMI for San Antonio.



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Match CRA-focus areas to non-focus areas using

- number of mortgages, population (size of the market)
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- house price changes (wealth and home equity change)
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- ► Low-Minority: 0-5% higher.
- ► High-Minority: 40-50% higher.

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- 2. Does current regulation dampen this relationship?
 - ► No just the opposite.
 - CRA-designated focus areas report *lower* quality.
 - The effect is substantially larger for high-minority areas.

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