

# "Revitalize or Stabilize": Does Community Development Financing Work?

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#### Disclaimer

 The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the author and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors.







### **Community Development**

- U.S. marked by persistent differences in economic outcomes across communities
- Policy response: place-based encouragement of private investment and lending
  - e.g. Enterprise Zones, Empowerment Communities, Opportunity Zones, New Market Tax Credit, Community Reinvestment Act (CRA)










#### **Public and Private Efforts**

- Public subsidies are bait for private capital
- Private community development (CD) money dwarfs public expenditures
  - \$100+ billion in annual CD bank loans
  - More in CD investments held on bank balance sheets
  - Largest public subsidies are a few \$ billion/year in tax breaks











## Financing Community Development

- Defined under CRA, CD activities intended to:
  - Create or retain permanent jobs, businesses and population in disadvantaged areas
  - Allow small firms to hire low- and moderate-income workers
  - Support affordable housing
  - Build essential infrastructure
- Financing with a particularly pro-social purpose
- Does it work?
  - Social return could be high if financial markets under-serve certain areas
  - However, federally-favored purposes may not be most efficient. Subsidies could distort allocation
  - Further, if financing is elastically supplied, limited net response









## This Paper

- Uses unique data on bank CD financing at local level
  - Hand collected from thousands of CRA performance evaluation documents
- Observe the response when banks with a high (low) tendency to supply CD loans gain (lose) deposit market share
  - Exploits fixed bank tendencies to engage in CD lending across markets
- Finding: \$56,000 in annual CD loans creates one net job. No effect on affordable housing supply, house prices









### **Community Development Data**

- Hand collected from over 6,300 CRA performance evaluations
  - Covers full range of banks sizes
  - Exam years 2004-2017
- Recorded dollars of CD lending and investing for each bank, exam and assessment area
  - Assessment areas are generally collections of contiguous counties/tracts in MSAs or non-MSA areas of a single state










### Banks' CD Lending Similar across Markets

- Divide markets into training sample
  (A) and test sample (B)
- 2. Estimate individual bank tendency to make CD loans relative to inmarket peers from (A)
- 3. Correlate tendency from (A) with actual lending in (B)
- 4. Repeat 500x












# Elasticity of County Total Wage Bill to CD Supply

- CD "generous" banks gain deposit market share in a county in year *t*
- Wage bill rises 0.012% in year t+2 for every
  1% increase in CD loan supply
  - Similar results for employee counts (0.008%)
- No pre-trends in years t-4 to t
  - Suggests CD "generous" banks aren't differentially entering growing/shrinking markets

Annual Wage Bill Growth (Percent)











#### Other Outcomes

- No apparent effect of CD loan supply on number of affordable housing units or house prices
- Effects of loans on employment and wages are robust to:
  - County and state-by-year fixed effects
  - Rich set of controls for changing banking/deposit market conditions
- No change in mortgage lending, small increase in small business and farm lending







# **Implications**

- 150 million jobs in U.S. and \$100 billion in CD loans
  - Estimated elasticity of employment was 0.082
  - Adjusting for 30% crowd out, implies \$56,000 in CD lending creates one net job
- Increasing the supply of CD lending does demonstrably lead to better economic outcomes for communities
- However, missing complete counterfactual
  - What else could those funds have supported?
  - If in a non-local market, opportunity cost is invisible





